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Abstract 
This paper examines financing for development trends, actors and policies since the 2002 Monterrey 
Conference and the new role acquired by the South-South dimension. In particular, we highlight the 
changing role of South-South cooperation, to reflect tectonic shifts in the global economy and as 
reflected in the new discourse on global development that has emerged since the 2011 Busan High-
Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness and the 2012 Rio+20 UN Conference on Sustainable Development. 
We complement the analysis of major policy statements and the application of relevant principles with 
a case study on how the different geographical (North-South, South-South, triangular) and functional 
(ODA, FDI, trade, remittances, etc.) dimensions of development finance are playing out in Myanmar, 
arguably the last country to open up to political and economic liberalization. 
Keywords 
Sustainable development, development finance, development cooperation, South-South, Myanmar 
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Introduction* 
This paper examines financing for development trends, actors and policies since the 2002 Monterrey 
Conference and the new role acquired by the South-South dimension. In particular, we highlight how 
the role of South-South cooperation is changing, to reflect tectonic shifts in the global economy and as 
reflected in the new discourse on global development that has emerged since the Busan High-Level 
Forum on Aid Effectiveness (December 2011) and the Rio+20 UN Conference on Sustainable 
Development (June 2012). We complement the analysis of major policy statements and the application 
of relevant principles with a case study on how the different geographical (North-South, South-South, 
triangular) and functional (ODA, FDI, trade, remittances, etc.) dimensions of development finance are 
playing out in Myanmar, arguably the most important country to open up to political and economic 
liberalization in recent years. 
The Context: Development Resources since the 2002 Monterrey Conference 
In March 2002, the International Conference on Financing for Development adopted the Monterrey 
Consensus.
1
 On that occasion the international community recognized the need of collective 
approaches to mobilize and increase the effective use of financial resources and achieve the national 
and international economic conditions needed to fulfill internationally agreed development goals, 
including those contained in the Millennium Declaration, to make the twenty-first century “the century 
of development for all” (¶ 3).  
Through the Consensus, developed and developing countries committed “to mobilizing domestic 
resources, attracting international flows, promoting international trade as an engine for development, 
increasing international financial and technical cooperation for development, sustainable debt 
financing and external debt relief, and enhancing the coherence and consistency of the international 
monetary, financial and trading systems” (¶ 4).  
Official development assistance (ODA) was recognized as a critical component of development for 
regions and countries with the least capacity to attract investment. These include least developed 
countries, small island developing states and landlocked developing countries. The 2008 Doha 
Declaration on Financing for Development reaffirmed the basis tenets of such new framework for 
development cooperation. 
In the decade since 2002 major institutional changes – in particular China’s entry in the WTO – 
and technological advances – such as the widespread diffusion of ICT – have increased the global 
importance of emerging economies, especially from the Asia-Pacific region.
2
 The financial and 
economic crisis has resulted in a further acceleration in the transformation of the economic landscape. 
The recession has been shorter, and the recovery stronger, in emerging economies than in traditional 
industrial ones. The G20 (with the participation of Argentina, Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, 
Saudi Arabia, South Africa, South Korea, and Turkey) has replaced the G8 as the premier forum for 
international economic cooperation. The on-going process of reform of the Bretton Woods institutions 
                                                     
*
 At the time of writing, the author was an independent consultant, temporarily based in Myanmar on a short-term 
technical assistance mission funded by the Italian Development Cooperation. He benefited from exchanges with former 
colleagues at the East and Northeast Asian sub-regional office of the UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and 
the Pacific and seminar audiences at European University Institute in Fiesole, IAI in Rome, ISPI in Milan, and Club du 
CEPII in Paris. The usual caveats apply. 
1
 The Monterrey Consensus is a commitment to a broad-based development agenda that takes into account poverty 
reduction and environmental sustainability as well as economic growth. The text is available in full at: 
http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/aconf198-11.pdf 
2
 See in particular OECD (2010), Global Development Outlook: Shifting Wealth. 
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is also giving emerging economies a greater weight in the governance of the International Monetary 
Fund and the World Bank. In 2012, for the first time-ever, it was decided to seat a major international 
development organization – the Green Climate Fund – outside of the traditional North Atlantic 
countries – in Songdo, South Korea. 
From a quantitative standpoint, to list only a few major variables, since 2002 the weight of major 
emerging economies
3
 has grown: 
 from 18.4% to 24.6% of global GDP (constant 2000 US$); 
 from 25.3% to 34.4% of global trade – the ‘critical engine of growth’ according to the 
Consensus
4
;  
 from 11.7% to 43% of global private capital flows. 
Concurrently, the relative importance of the resources that the Monterrey Consensus identified as 
crucial to ensure progress towards attaining the MDGs has also changed. While global GDP has grown 
by 23.7% since 2002, trade has increased by 31.7%, private capital flows by 133.8%, and remittances 
by 161.4%.  
The geography of poverty has also changed, in two apparently contradictory directions. On the one 
hand, the majority of the world’s poor are now to be found in middle-income countries5; on the other 
hand, fragile and conflict-affected states are those characterized by the highest relative incidence of 
poverty
6
.  
New actors and stakeholders, including global funds (such as the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, 
Tuberculosis and Malaria), civil society organizations, the private sector, and philanthropic institutions 
have emerged. Trade is increasingly conducted within sophisticated global supply chains governed by 
multinational enterprises, with major implications for global development and policy-making. 
Principles and rules have been introduced to govern private capital flows – from instruments to flight 
against corruption and money laundering to mainstreaming responsible investing in financial markets. 
Against this background, South-South has emerged as a major axis of global economic interactions. 
This holds true for a broad variety of variables, from trade and investment, to migration and students’ 
circulation. While in the Consensus the reference to “South-South cooperation, including through 
triangular cooperation, to facilitate exchange of views on successful strategies, practices and 
experience and replication of projects” is somehow buried in the text at ¶ 19 on p. 8. By the time of the 
United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development in 2012 (so-called Rio+20
7
), the tone had 
changed: the Leaders’ statement see South-South cooperation, as well as triangular cooperation, as 
“provid[ing] much needed additional resources to the implementation of development programmes” 
and “recognize the importance and different history and particularities of South-South cooperation” (¶ 
260, p. 49). 
                                                     
3
 Defined as those included in the MSCI Emerging Markets Index – namely China, Indonesia, India, Korea, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, and Thailand in Asia-Pacific; Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru in the Americas; and Czech 
Republic, Egypt, Hungary, Morocco, Poland, Russia, South Africa and Turkey in EMEA – plus Argentina, Hong Kong, 
China, and Singapore. 
4
 Their share of world trade increased by an average of 0.8 percentage points a year in 1991 to 2011. The global recession 
accelerated things. Since 2008 the rise has been twice as fast, at 1.5 percentage points a year. 
5
 See Andy Sumner (2012), “Where Will the World’s Poor Live? An Update on Global Poverty and the New Bottom 
Billion”, Center for Global Development, Working Paper 305. 
6
 See Homi Kharas and Andrew Rogerson (2012), Horizon 2025: creative destruction in the aid industry, Overseas 
Development Institute. 
7
 The World We Want is a commitment to sustainable development and to the promotion of an economically, socially and 
environmentally sustainable future for the planet and for present and future generations. 
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Development Assistance since the 2002 Monterrey Conference 
A specific feature of the Monterrey Consensus was the recognition that achieving the goals of the UN 
Millennium Declaration in developing countries requires a substantial increase in aid and that donor 
countries should allocate 0.7% of gross national product (GNP) to ODA, a commitment first pledged 
in a United Nations resolution in 1970
8
 and constantly disaffected. This numerical commitment 
remains a valuable framework for international action on poverty reduction and the failure to fulfill it 
has attracted considerable attention.  
In 2010, the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD announced the highest 
volume of ODA in history: US$128.7 billion. In 2010, most of the DAC nations met important aid 
commitments, with several European donors surpassing the goal of 0.7% of GNP. The United States 
achieved the highest aid volume of any nation, although its ODA-to-GNP ratio was only 0.21%, 
compared to the overall DAC average of 0.32%. EU members accounted for well over half of global 
ODA in 2010. Nonetheless, a comparison of the 2010 ODA outcome with promises made in 2005 
shows a shortfall of US$19 billion.  
Growing, albeit still insufficient, ODA flows have been accompanied by a redefinition of the 
concept and practice of development co-operation policy, together with a profound reconsideration of 
its objectives, measurements, content and financing modes. It is now widely agreed that donor 
resources needs to be aligned with developing country priorities and development strategies must be 
locally owned if real and lasting results are to be achieved. In this regard, the “contractual 
relationship” between donors and recipients contains mutual obligations, thereby promoting mutual 
accountability. Other features of the emerging model of development assistance are predictability of 
flows (especially for infrastructure projects), coordination of donor resources and interventions, 
harmonization of auditing systems, untying of aid, and transparent transactions.  
Policy coherence for development is another concept that has gained ground. While considerable 
progress has been made in building the resilience of least developed countries to internal, external and 
structural challenges, they still face many constraints. In today’s interdependent world economy, 
domestic and foreign policies – such as trade, investment, agriculture and fisheries, taxation, security, 
innovation, migration, climate and environment – can stimulate or hinder growth and development in 
developing countries and impact on poverty reduction. Poor countries need both improved market 
access and financial investment to enhance their potential for increased trade. More generally, 
development co-operation efforts need to be supported by mutually reinforcing policies across a wide 
range of economic, social and environmental issues to ensure greater results and impact
9
. 
A focus on results and peer pressure respond to attacks that sustain that ODA tends to create 
dependency
10
. While access to ODA helped bridge the stimulus or funding “gap”, it may have retarded 
policy reform and institution-building. In a less confrontational way, recipient countries make the case 
for continued aid flows, accompanied by non-aid forms of development finance and enhanced mutual 
accountability. The expectation is to see predictable and catalytic development assistance as “a 
                                                     
8
 “International Development Strategy for the Second United Nations Development Decade”, UN General Assembly 
Resolution 2626 (XXV), 24 October 1970, ¶ 43. See “History of the 0.7% ODA Target”, DAC Journal 2002, Vol. 3, No. 
4, pp. 9–11. 
9
 The OECD Development Strategy emphasizes the role of mutual learning, knowledge-sharing and whole-of-government 
approaches to act on global issues such as the fight against illicit flows, the promotion of fiscal transparency and 
budgeting, and improving policy frameworks for investment. 
10
 See Dambisa Moyo (2010), Dead Aid. Why Aid is Not Working and How There Is A Better Way for Africa, Farrar, 
Straus and Giroux. New York. 
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powerful driver of development progress, helping countries to strengthen essential capacities, 
institutions, services and infrastructure, and attract broader sources of development finance” 11. 
Another criticism is that in recent years ODA from DAC members has over-emphasized social 
policies and governance issues, while neglecting cross-sector investment, in particular for 
infrastructure and energy. The economic and financial crisis could also be used as a pretext for 
limiting aid – which would be very unfortunate since least developed countries face economic crises 
all the time. Donors acknowledge that transparency would enhance public support for ODA and 
thereby reduce that risk. 
South-South and Triangular Cooperation 
Many countries of the Global South have lifted more and more of their own citizens out of poverty and 
have, in turn, taken on shared responsibilities in the pursuit of common development objectives, 
economic growth and poverty reduction in developing countries. These nations have accumulated 
experiences and recorded successes in development-related areas and can provide valuable impetus, 
ideas and means for other countries in the South to address similar concerns and challenges.  
The role of major emerging economies is therefore also growing in the case of global development 
finance
12
, and ODA flows in particular. Although differences in reporting standards and transparency 
requirements make it very difficult to come to a precise estimate, the nine largest non-DAC actors that 
report to the DAC had roughly US$8 billion in gross ODA in 2010 (Figure 1). In fact, in some cases, 
such ODA flows exceed the contributions made by individual DAC members. In 2010, Saudi Arabia’s 
gross ODA exceeded the volumes of 12 of the 23 DAC countries. In the same year, China provided 
slightly less than Switzerland, Turkey a bit more than Ireland.  
  
                                                     
11
 See OECD (2012), Draft Summary Record of the 19th Meeting, Working Party on Aid Effectiveness, 
DCD/DAC/EFF/M(2012)4/PROV. 
12
 In the case of trade, developing countries now export more to other developing countries than to rich ones. In 2002 
developing countries bought only 40% of total developing-country exports; the rest went to rich nations. In 2010 the 
share was split evenly. Now the developing-country share is larger. See World Bank (2013), Global Economic Prospects, 
Trade Annex. 
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Figure 1. Gross ODA in 2010 
(Current US$ billion) 
 
Large emerging donors including Brazil, China, India, Turkey and South Africa prefer to engage in 
partnerships with other developing countries under the framework of South-South Cooperation (SSC). 
It is important to note that SSC is not a new form of development co-operation, since its foundations 
were laid in the Declaration on Promotion of World Peace and Co-operation adopted at the Bandung 
Conference in Indonesia in 1955. For the next quarter of century, SSC existed as an expression of 
political solidarity and aspiration of developing countries, periodically reaffirmed through statements 
of the G-77 and UNCTAD and initiatives such as the Bangkok Agreement and the Global System of 
Trade Preferences (GSTP). Following early bilateral initiatives such as the Tribhuvan highway 
(linking Kathmandu to the Nepal-India border
13
) or the TAZARA railway (built by the Chinese in 
record times to connect land-locked Zambia to the Indian Ocean bypassing then-Rhodesia and South 
Africa, the Buenos Aires Programme of Action (BAPA) for Promoting and Implementing Technical 
Cooperation among Developing Countries was adopted in 1978. 
SSC, however, experienced a major set-back during the 1980-90s, as the financial crisis led to the 
adoption of Structural Adjustment Programs mandated by the international financial institutions. The 
Washington Consensus, no surprise here, gave very scarce drift to SSC. While the state-led and 
introverted model of development clearly showed its limits, with few role models and success stories 
for the rest of the South, the SSC discourse remained heavy on political rhetoric and light on economic 
reality
14
. Insufficient differentiation between countries in terms of resource endowments, technologies 
                                                     
13
 The Indian technical and economic co-operation (ITEC) program under the Technical and Economic Co-operation 
Division of the Ministry of External Affairs has been in operation since 1964. 
14
 The tragic irony could possibly not be lost of adopting the BAPA (which considers strengthened technical cooperation 
among developing countries as “an important component of any future strategy that seeks […] to enahance (sic) human 
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and expertise combined with the lack of communication and transportation linkages to limit the range 
and depth of mutually beneficial exchanges. The South Commission Report in 1990 well summarized 
the situation, seeing the South as “existing on the periphery of the North, mostly weak and powerless 
in the world arena”15. 
SSC of the 21
st
 century takes place in a new environment, partly summarized by the above-
mentioned statistics. More broadly, the emergence of the Global South as a dynamic, competitive 
supplier of goods and services means that “role models” are now available (sometimes even too 
readily, as exemplified by the catchphrase “Beijing Consensus”), as are education, science and 
technology in parts of South, allowing beneficial technological transfers and South-South migration, 
including of highly-qualified individuals. The positive side of major gaps between and within the 
countries is the presence of increasing complementarities, coexisting with growing experience in 
meeting challenges of governance (e.g. performance of public administration, delivery of services)
16
. 
Nonetheless, countries in the Global South also have to confront the poverty problem at home and it is 
far from sure that public opinion will not come to question SSC if and when domestic growth slows 
down. 
In addition SSC providers may implement triangular programs and projects with DAC Donors. 
SSC is based on a combination of geographic proximity, cultural affinity, and similarities of 
development context. This helps lower transaction costs and provides policy experiences and technical 
solutions that are better suited to the socioeconomic context of recipient countries. Also SSC and 
triangular cooperation can have a more holistic approach to development by combining assistance 
with trade, investment, technology and capacity development. Some DAC donors have taken the lead 
in devising and implementing triangular cooperation – Japan in particular17. 
In the 2008 Accra Agenda for Action, countries and organizations recognized the importance of 
SSC to international development co-operation and acknowledged that much can be learned from the 
experience of developing countries (¶ 19). It emphasized that SSC can be a valuable complement to 
North-South co-operation and encouraged donor countries and organizations to support SSC through 
triangular co-operation. Following Accra, a group of countries formed the Task-Team on South-South 
Co-operation (TT-SSC) to promote an evidence-based dialogue on how SSC can support the 
achievement of sustainable development results. The analytical work produced by the TT-SSC 
indicates that the effectiveness of South-South and triangular co-operation stems from its flexibility 
and capacity to adapt development experiences and practices to particular national contexts. These 
partnerships are often based on trust and long-term relationships, aiming to ensure equality among 
partners and to generate mutual benefit. 
IBSA – the political grouping of the largest non-Western democracies (India, Brazil, and South 
Africa) – provides an example. It supports poor nations though the IBSA Facility Fund for Alleviation 
of Poverty of Hunger, used to implement cooperation projects in LDCs and countries recovering from 
conflicts. To support activities, each IBSA country contributes US$1 million per year to the Fund, 
that. So far the Fund has implemented four projects, including the construction of a sports complex in 
Ramallah, a solid waste collection project in Haiti, the refurbishment of health units in Cape Verde, 
and an additional one in Guinea-Bissau. 
(Contd.)                                                                  
dignity and progress” (BAPA, ¶ 14) in a country that in 1978 was one of the worst offenders of the principles of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
15
 South Commission (1990), The Challenge to the South, Oxford University Press. 
16
 Nagesh Kumar (2009), “South-South and Triangular Cooperation in Asia-Pacific: Towards a New Paradigm in 
Development Cooperation”, UNESCAP, Working Papers, No. WP/09/05. 
17
 Japan began to practice SSC in 1954 and reflected its importance in the 2003 ODA Charter, emphasizing the need to 
cooperate with other advanced developing countries in Asia. As of November 2009, JICA had concluded Partnership 
Programs involving Pivotal Countries (i.e. emerging donors) with 12 recipient countries 
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South-South and Triangular Cooperation at the UN and the World Bank Group 
The UN has continually been supporting various activities to promote South-South Cooperation in the 
form of policy support and capacity-building activities among others. Under the guidance of the High-
Level Committee on South-South Cooperation (HLC/SSC)
18
, SSC has been prioritized as a key 
modality for promoting collaborative initiatives at the national, regional and interregional levels. In 
2003, the UN General Assembly decided to declare 19 December, UN Day for South-South 
Cooperation. The Triennial Comprehensive Policy Review (TCPR) adopted by the UN General 
Assembly in 2007, reaffirms the increased importance of SSC, and encourages the funds, programs, 
specialized agencies and other entities of the UN system involved to mainstream support to SSC and 
triangular cooperation. It also requested the UN development system to intensify its information 
sharing and reporting on support to and results achieved through SSC, including triangular 
cooperation. 
The Nairobi Outcome Document on South-South Cooperation was adopted in 2009. It urges UN 
funds, programs and specialized agencies to take concrete measures to support South-South 
cooperation by acting as catalysts for cooperation and strengthening the capabilities of regional 
organizations. Within the UN system, a number of UN bodies (UNDP, UNCTAD, UNIDO, UNESCO, 
WHO, FAO, etc.) have strategic and operational mechanisms to promote SSC to address their 
respective institutional and capacity development mandates (Table 1). For FAO, for instance, this 
expertise will strengthen the role and impact of SCC support to NPFS (National Programs for Food 
Security) and RPFS (Regional Programs for Food Security), in terms of an increased number of 
experts and technicians, and technical coverage, and it is expected to lead to the rapid improvement in 
the livelihood of small-scale rural producers. In the case of UNEP, SSC is pivoted around technology 
transfer, capacity-building in environmentally-sound use of technologies, and sustainable management 
of natural resources. 
  
                                                     
18
 Which replaced the High-Level Committee on the Review of Technical Cooperation among Developing Countries at the 
UN General Assembly in 2004. 
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Table 1. South-South Cooperation within the UN System 
  
FAO  FAO is committed to making SSC a key component of its SPFS (Special Programme for Food 
Security) activities. While practical constraints like language barrier, remuneration, etc. are being 
addressed, the SSC initiative has the potential of reaching out quickly to large numbers of people at 
a relatively low cost with appropriate technology. Up to April 2010, 40 agreements have been 
signed and over 1,400 experts and technicians had worked in the field. Strategic SSC Alliances are 
being developed with selected countries in support of NPFS (National Programmes for Food 
Security) and RPFS (Regional Programmes for Food Security). In March 2010, China and FAO 
established a USD 30 million trust fund in support of SSC in selected countries, under which new 
SSC agreements are under signature process between the first group of African countries and 
China. Similar agreements have been signed with Indonesia and Argentina and are under 
discussion with India and Morocco.  
ILO The 100th session of the International Labour Conference in 2011 called upon the ILO to facilitate 
the exchange of experiences and good practices, the transfer of knowledge and by mutual 
agreement, the transfer of technologies among member States including the promotion of South-
South and triangular exchange of experiences and expertise. Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico have 
signed a G20 Declaration of Brasilia on 10 May 2011, in which they committed to strengthen 
South-South, Triangular and North-South cooperation as well as the sharing of knowledge on 
social protection. The Social Protection Floor Advisory Group, chaired by Michelle Bachelet, 
acknowledged that some low-income countries need external support to build social protection and 
recommend an intensification of South-South, triangular and North-South cooperation in the area 
of social protection. “South-South and triangular cooperation: Implementation of gender sensitive 
Social Protection Floors at country level” supports selected countries from the South in designing 
and implementing national social protection floors. This project is the result of collaboration 
between the UNDP Special Unit for South-South Cooperation and the ILO. Five countries have 
been initially selected: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Lao PDR and Togo. 
UNEP  The SSC Exchange Mechanism is a new online database that aims to strengthen partnerships 
between sustainable development initiatives and projects in developing countries. The Reducing 
Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD) Programme supported the first 
South-South Exchange on Participatory Governance Assessment (PGA) for REDD+. 
UNESCO The International Centre for South-South Cooperation in Science, Technology and Innovation was 
inaugurated in Kuala Lumpur in May 2008. The Centre facilitates the integration of a 
developmental approach into national science and technology and innovation policies, and provides 
policy advice. In parallel to organizing capacity-building activities and exchanging best practices, 
the Centre conducts research and tackles specific problems in science, technology and innovation 
policy-making in developing countries.  
UNHABITAT UN-Habitat has been committed to promoting SSC and triangular collaboration as a means of 
delivering on the commitments contained in the Habitat Agenda and the implementation of the 
Millennium Development Goals and targets. SSC and triangular cooperation allow for capacity-
building, sharing of knowledge and technology transfer. Strengthening this cooperation could help 
all involved partners contribute to addressing the national, regional and global developmental 
goals. For the first time, the Government of India is committing funds to UN-Habitat for the 
reconstruction of 16,800 houses in Sri Lanka damaged and destroyed by three decades of conflict. 
China has been working with UN-Habitat in Africa to provide technical assistance, training and 
facilitating city-to-city exchange. In the Lake Victoria Region, for example, 45 mayors, town 
clerks, urban planners and other professionals from 17 cities paid visits to Shanghai, Hangzhou, 
Shaoxing and Zhangjiagang before the Fourth World Urban Forum in Nanjing. As a follow up, 
seven officials member delegation from Shanghai’s Yangpu District visited East Africa to look for 
cooperation opportunities. As for technical assistance, the Yangzhou Municipality has supported 
the building of a housing complex in Dar es Salaam for female-headed households. Four engineers 
and construction managers worked to provide technical assistance for the project in Dar es Salaam 
where solar heaters and solar street lights were also provided. 
UNICEF In 2007, UNICEF’s Regional Office for East Asia and the Pacific, in consultation with Plan 
International and UNESCO, launched the Asia-Pacific Regional Network for Early Childhood 
(ARNEC) – a platform for South-South exchanges on early childhood development programs and 
policies. In November 2010, China hosted a High-Level Meeting, which adopted the Beijing 
Declaration on South-South Cooperation for Child Rights in the Asia and Pacific Region. 
UNIDO South-South Cooperation Centers have been established in China (Beijing 2006) and India (New 
Delhi 2007). Plans are underway for similar centers in Brazil, Indonesia, Iran, Morocco, and South 
Africa. Incepted in 2008, the Global South-South Development Expo (GSSD Expo) is the first 
exhibition of its kind for South–South solutions and a major stage to share development successes, 
explore new avenues for collaboration, forge innovative partnerships, and launch new South-South 
and triangular cooperation. The South-South Initiative on Cotton aims at building productive 
capacity in 11 African countries: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Ivory Coast, Mali, 
Nigeria, Senegal, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia. 
WFP The Centre for Excellence against Hunger, located in Brasilia, provides governments the 
opportunity to develop and improve their programs by accessing a global platform to exchange 
information about school meals and good practices of their own school meals programs. The ability 
to share Brazil’s experience with other nations, and bring together the best practices and programs 
from across the world is at the heart of the Centre of Excellence. 
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In 2011 the Joint Inspection Unit (JIU) carried out a system-wide review of the existing UN 
institutional arrangements in support of SSC and TC.
19
 While the review found that both have made 
their way, albeit slowly, across the UN system, it highlighted the need to improve overall system-wide 
policy frameworks, governance, coordination, structures, mechanisms and dedicated resources if the 
efforts are to attain full impact. Moreover, the Special Unit for South-South Cooperation (SU/SSC) 
should prioritize its activities and resources in line with its extended mandate.  
The World Bank launched the South-South Knowledge Exchange Hub, funded by the South-South 
Facility, in 2008. An interesting experience was carried out in Mongolia to enhance capacity to 
diversify the economy.
20
 Mongolia has successfully transitioned from a centrally planned to a market 
economy but remains overly dependent on its mining industries. Chile and Kazakhstan were selected 
as appropriate knowledge-sharing partners on account of having large mineral sectors and successfully 
implemented policies and reforms to diversify and develop clusters. Learning activities were held for 
key government officials, policymakers, and other stakeholders to learn about policy options and 
assess specific needs. Activities included workshops and case studies, videoconferences with research 
institutions through the Global Development Learning Network, and five-day study tours to Chile and 
Kazakhstan. An assessment revealed strengthened capacity in a number of key institutions and a 
dynamic network of stakeholders who help advance the economic reform agenda. 
New Governance Structures 
Acknowledging the changing development environment, the Third High-Level Forum (HLF) on Aid 
Effectiveness, held in Accra in September 2008 formally recognized the contributions made by all 
development actors and especially “the role of middle-income countries as both providers and 
recipients of aid” and stressed “the importance and particularities of South-South Co-operation”.21 The 
Fourth HLF, held in Busan in December 2011, went a step further to actively embrace and engage new 
development partners to play a greater role in promoting South-South and triangular cooperation as a 
complement to North-South development cooperation.  
Busan has brought with it complexity and ambiguity which, while at times challenging, better 
reflects the world in which we live. Cognizant of the need of reshaping the functioning of the OECD 
Development Assistance Committee (DAC), the new Global Partnership for Effective Development 
Cooperation (GPEDC) sets a new path to stronger partnerships between developed and developing 
countries. Backstopped by the DAC and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), the 
GPEDC was formally established on 28-29 June 2012 at the final meeting of the Working Party on 
Aid Effectiveness (hosted by UNESCO and the UN Development Group).  
On that occasion, the GPEDC mandate and light global arrangements to support the monitoring of 
the Busan commitments were agreed. Three ministerial Co-Chairs were appointed: Minister of 
Finance Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala of Nigeria; Minister of State for National Development Planning 
Armida Alisjahbana of Indonesia; and Secretary of State for International Development Andrew 
Mitchell of the United Kingdom. For the new partnership to be successful it will be imperative to 
make non-DAC donors comfortable that the emphasis is on coordination to achieve shared principles, 
common goals and differential responsibilities, not on cooperation or harmonization of approaches.  
As noted, at the UNCSD in June 2012 global Leaders expressed support for SSC, as well as TDC, 
which provide much-needed additional resources to the implementation of development programs. 
They acknowledged the importance and different history and particularities of SSC and that it should 
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 The following is based on South-South Knowledge Exchange Hub (2010), Enhancing Capacity to Diversify the 
Mongolian Economy. 
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 OECD (2008), The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the Accra Agenda for Action. 
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be seen as an expression of solidarity and cooperation between countries, based on their shared 
experiences and objectives. It is now a core element of the global development discourse that SSC 
complements, rather than substitutes for, North-South cooperation and that both support a 
development agenda that addresses the particular needs and expectations of developing countries. In 
this context the role played by middle-income developing countries as providers and recipients of 
development cooperation receives specific attention. Traditional donors are keen to collaborate to 
what are often called pivotal countries – that, by virtue of their capacities and experience in promoting 
SSC, are positioned to play a lead role in the promotion and application of SSC, mainly by sharing 
their capacities and experience with other developing countries in their region or in other regions. 
A number of other recent developments – such as the establishment of the Green Climate Fund at 
COP 16 in Durban in 2011 to achieve the ultimate objective of the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the decision to locate the GCF in Songdo, taken at 
COP 17 in Doha in 2012 – are also relevant in this context. With a governance structure as yet untried, 
participating developed countries agreed to raise US$100 billion per year from public and private 
sources to help developing countries fight climate change. The G20 has made Knowledge Sharing one 
of the nine pillars of the Multi-Year Work Plan initiated in Seoul in 2010
22
. 
South-South and Triangular Cooperation in action: the case of Myanmar 
Over the past few years, Myanmar has emerged as a crucial playground for development cooperation. 
In March 2011, President Thein Sein embarked on an ambitious program of political and economic 
reforms aimed at securing national reconciliation, ending longstanding Western sanctions and 
integrating Myanmar with the global system. During the past decade, the composition of development 
finance flows (including trade) has also sensibly changed, as the sanctions froze ODA while non-
OECD Asian countries that refrained from imposing them increased their FDI outflows to, and 
imports from, Myanmar (Figure 2). 
Figure 2. Composition of development finance flows to Myanmar 
(percentage) 
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The on-going reform process (that included the liberation of Nobel Prize winner Daw Aung San Suu 
Kyi) is unique in that the government is mostly composed of men (and very few women) associated 
with the repressive military regime that has ruled Myanmar since the 1960s. If it succeeds, in a few 
years it may turn the country into the most democratic one in the Greater Mekong region.
23
 
Possibly for the first time in the history of global aid, traditional and emerging development 
partners start off the block on a ground of parity. In fact, if any country has a small lead, it is a 
Southern one – China – rather than a Northern donor as it is most often the case. China was the main 
economic partner of the regime and in addition acted as Myanmar’s minder on the United Nations 
Security Council – deflecting criticism and blocking resolutions in the wake of heinous human rights 
abuses. Its engagement was functional to access to Burmese natural resources (natural gas, gems, 
timber and rubber) and in exchange guaranteed material privileges, windfall profits and monopoly 
rents to the Tatmadaw (the army) and the crony businessmen and politicians linked to the Union 
Solidarity and Development Party (USDP).
24
 That model, however, produced little economic growth 
and even less social development: be it in terms of access to electricity, land, public transport, 
telecoms, health and education, the Burmese now rank among the worst-served peoples in the world. 
Against this background, popular resentments towards the Chinese presence in, and economic 
exploitation of, Myanmar started rising a few years ago, something that China, despite historical 
precedents, failed to notice.
25
 The Latpadaungtaung copper project near Monywa, in northwest 
Myanmar’s Sagaing Division, symbolized the grim experience of Chinese business practices. The 
mine operators, state-owned Wan Bao Company (a subsidiary of arms manufacturer North China 
Industries Corp.) and the Union of Myanmar Economic Holding Limited (owned by the Myanmar 
military), stand accused of stealing thousands of hectares of land and provoking major environmental 
pollution.
26
 The junta also became increasingly uncomfortable with both its dependence on China for 
trade, aid and arms transfers and China’s growing commercial influence in Myanmar. 
President Thein Sein unleashed the pent-up pressure for change in recognition of the very concrete 
risk of missing the bandwagon of one of the world’s fastest-growing regions – once Southeast Asia’s 
most prosperous country, Myanmar now has the lowest GDP per capita and human development index 
within ASEAN. Thein Sein has sidelined the USDP and those around it, dismantling the system of 
monopolies and access to licenses, permits and contracts that sustained their political and economic 
power. He also halted until 2015 construction of the Myitsone hydroelectric dam on the Ayeyarwady 
river, a Chinese project in Kachin State that ignited controversy for its economic, social and 
environmental impact. It was set to flood an area the size of Singapore and export to China 90% of 
power generated, despite only a quarter of the domestic population having access to electricity. Taking 
that decision, Thein Sein “asserted his credentials in Myanmar as a man prepared to listen to his own 
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 Beijing “desires Burma as a vassal state for the construction of deep-water ports, highways and energy pipelines that will 
provide China’s landlocked south and west access to the sea, from where China’s ever-burgeoning middle class can 
receive deliveries of oil from the Persian Gulf”. See Robert Kaplan (2010), Monsoon: The Indian Ocean and the Future 
of American Power, Random House. 
25
 See Hongwei, Fan (2012). The 1967 anti-Chinese riots in Burma and Sino–Burmese relations. Journal of Southeast Asian 
Studies, 43, pp 234-256. Another Burmese complaint concerns China nationals that buy property, particularly in the 
Mandalay area, by assuming the identity of deceased Burmese. Already under the British, thousands of Indians succeeded 
in gaining ownership of the most productive farmland and the Burmese (who expelled them at independence) are afraid 
that the same may be happening again.  
26
 A protest was brutally suppressed on 29 November 2012 and dozens of monks suffered horrendous injuries. A 
government investigation commission charged with assessing the Latpadaungtaung controversy and protests released its 
final report in March 2013. The report states that the mine operators should be permitted to proceed with expansion plans, 
despite acknowledging an adverse environmental impact and the creation of few jobs for locals. According to the report, 
however, expansion should be conditioned on adequate compensation to locals for land taken during the commencement 
of mining operations in 2010 and for any additional takings resulting from the forthcoming expansion.  
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people and stand up to the exploitative Chinese. It was an astute domestic political move and a 
milestone in the country’s unfolding reform programme”.27 
Global business is giddy at the thought of making quick money in what is deemed world’s biggest 
remaining “virgin market.” During the sanctions era, all major Asian economies (such as China, India, 
Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam) were active through a 
combination of aid and economic support, with a relative high degree of tying in their cooperation. 
Japan is rapidly ramping up its presence in the country with a heavyweight deployment of government 
assistance and corporate investment.
28
 The Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA) – 
which did not withdraw from Myanmar after 1988 and has been continued to regard the Government 
as the direct counterpart for conducting Official Development Assistance – is working in cooperation 
with some of the country’s largest conglomerates (Mitsubishi, Marubeni and Sumitomo) and the 
Ministry of International Trade and Industry to build Thilawa. This large industrial zone on the 
outskirts of Yangon, the country’s long-neglected commercial capital, will also include banks, schools, 
hospitals, and a satellite city. JICA is also involved in other projects ranging from the Yangon urban 
development plan, electricity supply and a scheme to overhaul the country’s banking system.29 The 
Japanese government is also studying plans for mass transit systems, the rehabilitation of four power 
plants that provide electricity to Yangon, the construction of a second bridge over the Bago River and 
the addition of six berths to the port near Yangon that will serve the Thilawa project. It has already 
forgiven all outstanding debt and, in order to challenge China’s dominant position, is willing to lend to 
Myanmar on terms that are near giveaways: loans with an interest rate of well under 1% payable over 
50 years, with no payments due for the first 10 years. 
For Japan, eager to extend its extensive network of factories in the region, Myanmar is not simply a 
golden opportunity; the fact is, there’s almost nowhere else where it can tap into a cheap and 
disciplined labor force and create a manufacturing and industrial base similar to those established in 
Thailand and Indochina when they were at a similar stage of development (and salaries equally low). 
Relationship between the two countries are longstanding — and checkered. While Japanese 
occupation during World War II was brutal, Aung San, the country’s independence hero (and father of 
Daw Aung San Suu Kyi), trained in Japan before leading efforts to oust the British. Even today, many 
Japanese harbor sentimental feelings toward Myanmar, in part because of a popular 1956 film, “The 
Burmese Harp”30, in part because Burma shipped rice in the lean years after World War II.  
China is more focused on extracting natural resources, generating electricity, and exploiting 
Myanmar’s geographical position. China needs a port on the Indian Ocean in order to alleviate its 
‘Malacca Dilemma’ – 85% of China's energy is transported through the Malacca Straits, a route 
controlled by Singapore-based US forces. The twin oil and gas pipelines linking the Burmese coast 
into China would provide an alternative route and the Kyaukphyu port on Ramree Island in Rakhine 
State (exclusively for trans-shipping crude oil
31) complement China’s ‘string of pearls’ (navy bases), 
along with Hanbantota in Sri Lanka and Karachi in Pakistan. In addition, Beijing, which shares a 
disputed and porous border with Myanmar, is concerned with the armed conflict in the North (the 
Kachin and Karen ethnic groups) and drugs trade.  
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Quantitatively, Korean involvement is still in a different league, but it is becoming more and more 
visible. Daewoo International is building the Shwe gas pipeline and onshore terminal, in a consortium 
with state-owned Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise and others. Hyundai Heavy Industries and 
Samsung are to build Myanmar’s first major new electricity generating station of which none of the 
power will be exported. Samsung CAT Company has offered to buy 70,000 tons of unpolished rice 
from MAPCO.
32
 The Korea Development Institute, a government think-tank with an influence in 
Seoul policy circles that is difficult to overestimate (its past President recently became Minister of 
Finance), is building an equivalent institution in Yangon – somehow predictably called Myanmar 
Development Institute. KOICA is also carrying out various knowledge-sharing activities. There is an 
additional element in the Myanmar strategy of Seoul and it has to do with intra-Korean policy. North 
Korea executed a bloody attack in then-Rangoon in 1983 that decimated the South Korean government 
and the junta was an ally of Pyongyang, possibly collaborating on nuclear matters. Not only the 
current political transition is a loss of an important support for Pyongyang (coming on the heels of 
regime changes in the Middle East); it also shows a possible (albeit unlikely) scenario for the DPRK 
itself, as President Lee made clear when visiting Nay Pyi Taw.
33
  
In 2014 – eight years after it was stopped from chairing ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations) as Western countries objected on human rights grounds – Myanmar will lead the group, often 
considered the sole source of regional political pressure on Naypyitaw. Among regional partners, 
Thailand naturally remains the most prominent investor-nation. Italian-Thai Development was the 
initial promoter of the Dawei Special Economic Zone, a gigantic project close to the border agreed in 
2008 and designed around a petrochemical plan and a deep-sea port. The costs were greatly 
underestimated and would surpass US$11 billion and the project has suffered numerous delays. 
Thailand is also the principal destination for migrant workers, including skilled professionals.
34
 For a 
variety of reasons – including macroeconomic instability, lack of trust in the banking system, and the 
relative convenience of the informal hundi money transfer system – official remittances are low by 
Asian standards, but the potential for expansion is considerable.
35
 In addition to raising their 
investments, Indonesia and Malaysia tout a blunter line on anti-Muslim, anti-Rohingya sentiment in 
Myanmar.  
Beyond ASEAN, India, which shares a history of British colonial rule and a 1,463km border, 
reversed initial support for Myanmar’s democratically-elected winners of the 1990 election in favor of 
“pragmatic engagement” with the junta.36 Nonetheless, after a decade-and-a-half of playing catch-up 
with China, its bilateral trade still amount to less than a fifth of Myanmar-China commerce. Sittwe 
Port’s modernization and the dredging of the Kaladan River, India’s biggest investment so far, was 
agreed in 2008 but began only in late 2010.
37
 Bangladesh says it wants to increase trade and buy some 
of Burma’s new offshore natural gas and Laos has agreed to build a “friendship bridge” spanning the 
Mekong River. 
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Western development partners have quickly shown sometime unexpected enthusiasm to provide 
whatever support is needed, in the form of financial resources, technical assistance and knowledge-
sharing. ODA figures in Myanmar are rapidly outdated and of little use, in view of the constantly 
changing situation, but first-hand observation on the ground suggests some broad trends: 
 The United Kingdom, as the former colonial power, and Australia are the most engaged. They 
will jointly provide up to US$500 million in development assistance from 2011 to 2015, in order 
to deliver better quality education for more than two million children, increased incomes for 
farmers, improved health particularly for women and girls, wider support for peace and 
development in ethnic areas, and practical support for a better-managed economy, responsible 
investment, Parliament and the rule of law. The Myanmar Education Consortium (housed by 
Save the Children International in Yangon) will support the non-government education sector—
in particular in monastic and community schools—in some of the poorest and most remote areas 
of Myanmar. The focus is the education MDG — ensuring all children will be able to complete a 
full course of primary schooling. DFID and AusAID were also the first donors to announce the 
opening of a liaison office in Nay Pyi Taw, together with. 
 The United States concluded the Partnership for Democracy, Peace, and Prosperity with 
Myanmar (although it still calls it Burma). USAID (whose Administrator Shah made his first-
ever visit in March 2013) is working with local counterparts, as well as American private sector, 
universities, and non-governmental organizations to provide humanitarian, democracy, human 
rights, governance, and economic development assistance. 
 Norwegian aid to Myanmar has seen a major increase in recent years, with democracy promotion 
and emergency relief been the keywords for such efforts. Norway is now contributing with 
expert assistance and sharing of experiences with the government in relation to the reform 
process. So far, the funds have mainly gone to voluntary organizations, but in recognition of the 
reforms Norway is planning to initiate state-to-state bilateral assistance from 2013. Myanmar has 
also entered the radar screen of Norwegian business: in June 2013, Telnor won one of the two 
new mobile telephony licenses and various firms are active in the energy and forestry sectors. 
 Other European countries maintain a more cautious attitude, still largely focusing on 
humanitarian assistance. There are however signals of deeper engagement. Germany is is 
implementing three projects in the context of sustainable economic development, focusing on 
financial sector development and small- and medium-sized enterprises, for more than €5 million 
annually. France has pledged €3 million over four years, focusing on agriculture, health, water, 
and sanitation. 
Against this background, defining what is North and what is South in the complex landscape of major 
donors in Myanmar is not easy. The classification problem is not with the emerging donors but rather 
which Japan (and Korea). On the one hand, insofar as they are clearly committed to observe the DAC 
principles – even when doing it may jeopardize their competitive position vis-à-vis other less 
scrupulous countries – they can be classified in the North. On the other hand, their rhetoric constantly 
refer to South-South cooperation, their diagnostics “acknowledge the shortcomings of the international 
assistance in sustaining positive outputs of the development programs which have undermined the 
lives of the people our mission seeks to protect”,38 and their practices assign a crucial role to 
cooperation with government bodies and involvement of the business sector – all features that make 
them similar to the emerging Asian donors. 
The challenges and risks for the quasi-civilian government are numerous and it is now asking 
international support to implement an ambitious reform package that includes various quick-impact 
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measures to produce tangible effects on living conditions and win the confidence of the population 
ahead of the 2015 elections. In January 2013, at the first Myanmar Development Cooperation Forum, 
partners agreed to prioritize implementation of specific policies under the government’s Economic and 
Social Reform Framework and approved the Nay Pyi Taw Accord, a five-page non-binding agreement 
that sets out guidelines to ensure added value in development cooperation. The government agrees to 
maintain a high-level dialogue with the donors about its “people-centered” national and regional 
development policies. It also promises to strengthen the rule of law, respect human rights, improve 
public administration, and include civil society organizations in the government decision-making 
process. Donors for their part agree to align assistance projects with the government policies in fields 
such as education, health, poverty reduction and economic development.
39
 
Looking forward, the most interesting question regarding development cooperation in Myanmar 
has to do with the ability of China to adapt its discourse and praxis to the changing reality. For roughly 
a decade, government officials and the business community (comprising of both large-scale state-
owned multinationals and small-scale private entrepreneurs, mostly from Yunnan in the country’s 
underdeveloped southwestern region) simply assumed that the Burmese would welcome their presence 
and work. Hence the “shock” and “surprise” of scholars and officials in China when Thein Sein 
launched the reforms and showed his seriousness and determination by taking decisions against 
Chinese business interests.
40
 In an era of renewed tension between America and China in the region, 
Beijing considers Myanmar’s recent opening as a tilt towards the West, in which Beijing’s loss has 
been Washington’s gain.  
To a large extent, the mistake “was to focus only on building relationships with government 
officials, without paying any attention to ‘domestic political nuances’. Thus China missed the vital 
shifts in policies, words and political thinking that they might have picked up had they listened to 
voices other than the government’s and engaged the country at a local level”.41 China has already run 
into some of these issues – outright ignorance of the local context and lack of political antennae on the 
ground – in other developing areas.42 A editorial in the Global Times warned Chinese businesses to 
take local sensitivities into account when doing business in Myanmar.
43
 Myanmar will test China’s 
ability to learn, show respect for local customs and people, and invest more in corporate social 
responsibility and other forms of soft power.
44
 CNPC has spent more than US$10 million to build 
local schools, hospitals and infrastructure in Kyaukpyu including a reservoir and drinking water 
facilities for the island’s five main villages.45 
While in 2011 bilateral trade between the two countries came to US$6.5 billion and cross-border 
trade, straddling Kachin and Shan states, topped US$2.2 billion in 2012, it may be too late for Beijing 
to regain the place of ‘sugar daddy’ and secure complete control over Burma’s coast and pipelines. At 
the same time, Myanmar knows that there is no benefit in completely sidelining its powerful northern 
neighbor, and that should hold even if Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s opposition wins the 2015 general 
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election. The debt crisis and stagnation of Western economies only add to the appeal of China in 
Myanmar for the foreseeable future. 
Many other Asian projects are making slow progress. The long-awaited India-Myanmar-Thailand 
highway connection — dubbed India’s Gateway to Asean — has been under discussion since 2004, 
but Myanmar and India have yet to sign a project agreement. Despite the public endorsement of Prime 
Minister Yingluck Shinawatra and President Thein Sein, no investor is willing to foot the bill on the 
Dawei project. Increasing Western engagement means that the window of opportunity for New Delhi 
or Bangkok will narrow, although they will still have geographical and cultural advantages to deploy 
in its less developed neighbor.  
Closer cross-border economic ties between Burma and its neighbors are hindered by the same 
problems that make the business environment too murky for Western investors: the continuing 
absence of a proper legal and regulatory framework and the lack of a trained independent judiciary to 
enforce fair play. While Myanmar is currently adapting its regulatory framework to improve the 
country’s attractiveness for investors, like ending some monopolies and abandoning the official 
exchange rate, the process is marked by a near-complete lack of transparency or consultation with 
stakeholders. The precarious ceasefires with ten ethnic rebel groups and the lack of the administrative 
skills needed to handle investment planning also pose significant risks. Interestingly, for the first time 
in its foreign policy history China is taking an active role in the domestic politics of a foreign country, 
hosting talks between the government and the Kachin rebels.
46
 
The Road Ahead 
The global economy is going through an unprecedentedly quick phase of deep changes, exemplified 
by expressions such as shifting wealth or Global South. At the same time, the imperative of global 
development takes new urgency in the face of global challenges such as climate change, new 
pandemics and poverty and destitution in fragile states. As a result the development finance agenda 
has to adapt rapidly, with the recognition that aid is but one, albeit a necessary component, of the 
whole package and that new non-financing modalities have an important role to play. Against this 
background, SSC acquires increased centrality, through both new directions of financial flows and 
capacity development – the exchange of experts, technical assistance, information on best practices, 
and initiatives to increase joint-negotiation capacities.  
Fast change does not equal the sudden disappearance of the West, as shown in the case of 
Myanmar, and new forms of exchange and governance must be sought. Southern countries – emerging 
donors and recipient countries alike – constantly mention that a true partnership would require honest 
dialogue based on trust, respect, and transparent mutual accountability. Knowing that political and 
human rights remain insufficiently protected in many developing and emerging economies and 
counting the number of kleptocrats at many South-South summits, it is easy to be cynical and dismiss 
such calls as self-serving arguments to shield SSC from the higher standards that DAC members have 
developed over the years and that civil society expect them to apply. But it would be a serious 
mistake: at a minimum SSC challenges the traditional aid approach to make it less patronizing and 
unimaginative, in the long run it will contribute to the emergence of a new consensus in which results, 
processes and capacity development receive equal drift. This will also depend on the success in 
making progress on specific fronts: from the establishment of pivotal countries (those that, by virtue of 
their experience in promoting SSC, are positioned to play a lead role in sharing their capacities with 
other developing countries in their region or in other regions) to the integration of TDC in national 
planning processes and its extension beyond government-to-government exchanges (in particular to 
the private sector and civil society organizations). 
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But there are important critiques to be made of SSC. Relationships like the one prevailing in 
Myanmar before 2011 are a far cry from the peer-to-peer relationships lauded since the Bandung 
conference. If SSC is to go beyond simplistic rhetoric and live up to mounting expectations, ties must 
also be fostered between peoples, not just governments. With due and legitimate adaptations, policy 
coherence must also enter into the practice of SSC – nowadays some of the prima facie most generous 
countries in the Global South maintain almost insurmountable barriers (including tariff escalation) to 
the upgrading of exports from poorer developing countries. 
International organizations, including universal membership ones such as the UN system and the 
World Bank and clubs such as the OECD, have a leading role to play. The constantly increasing 
complexity of 'aidscape' makes it necessary to discuss and adapt the global governance of the aid 
effectiveness agenda. Harnessing and fine-tuning global and regional mechanisms for development 
cooperation and building strong bridges across the globe will hopefully bring increased opportunities 
to scale up all forms of co-operation (traditional as well as SSC and TDC) and ensure that all 
countries, regardless of their size or stage of development, benefit from globalization. Specific issues 
to be addressed include: 
 the key challenges and opportunities provided by the South-South agenda for developing 
regions; 
 the experience with regional learning processes and the opportunity for shaping common 
regional agendas;  
 the shape of the agenda for South-South and triangular co-operation from the perspective of all 
development partners;  
 the instruments and processes to build synergies between North-South and South-South Co-
operation; 
 the role of regional and global organizations to facilitate and broker South-South Cooperation 
and to help countries develop their institutional capacity for this agenda.  
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